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"You Can't Be Any Poorer Than Dead":
Difficulties in Recognizing Artificial
Nutrition and Hydration as Medical Treatments
by
Stephen J. Heaney, Ph.D.
College of St. Thomas, St. Paul, MN

The President's Commission Report Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining
Treatment comes down squarely in favor of two propositions: 1) artificial
provision ofnutrition and hydration are medical treatments, and 2) as such, these
medical treatments may be foregone by certain categories of patients or their
proxies. This latter conclusion is based on roughly consequentialist grounds; the
former is more assumed than argued
There is a school of thought opposed to both of these conclusions. After first
demonstrating that nourishment is not medicine, a non-consequentialist or
natural law argument is employed to show that nourishment may not be foregone
insofar as it violates the principle, "First, do no harm. "
I was once a member ofthis school, and this paper was to argue its position. In
the end, however, this paper adopts the position that artificial provision of
nourishment and hydration can be medical treatments, and as such may be
foregone by certain categories of patients, without violating a natural law
understanding of "First, do no harm. " Still, exposing my retained sympathies for
my former position, the paper attempts to argue for a very careful standard for
non-treatment.
As a result, the argument of the paper takes four steps. First, I present the
argument that artificial provision ofnutrition is never medical treatment, giving as
much strength to that argument as possible. Second, I show how the focus of that
argument leads it astray, and that artificial provision of nourishment is medical
treatment. Third, I try to show by what standard patients (or proxies) can
legitimately forego this medical treatment Fourth, I point out where my former
position has valid criticisms ofcertain arguments used by those who hold that such
treatment may be withdrawn, and urge great caution in deciding to forego
treatment.
The President's Commission Report, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining
Treatments, 1 makes it quite clear that it regards the artificial provision of nutrition
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and hydration as medical treatment against which a patient or proxy may
legitimately decide. This finding is in line with recent American Medical
Association guidelines,2 and an ever-increasing volume of writers in medical
ethics.
For those in the "nourishment does not equal medicine" camp, there are
several problems in the AMA/President's Commission approach that need to be
discussed.
a) What are the reasons for considering nourishment and hydration as
medical treatments? The literature is largely devoid of such explanations. In fact,
the very question is often treated as though the answer is too obvious to discuss.
This trait in the literature is illustrated in the following excerpt from an article by
two well-respected Jesuit bioethicists; here they are invoking the authority of
Gerald Kelly on the principle "no useless remedy is obligatory."
Kelly's application of the principle is instructive. He immediately asks if all artificial
means are remedies, or are some, such as intravenous feeding, merely designed to
supplant a natural means of sustaining life? He quickly dismisses the speculative
difference as irrelevant and insists that in the world of sick people, all artificial means
sustaining life are remedies for some diseased or defective condition. Kelly specifically
applies this holding to the use of oxygen or intravenous feeding to sustain life in the
so-called "hopeless" cases. 3

This dismissive attitude toward those who hold a different position is stinging.
The Commission Report cites yet another source which concludes that
"distinguishing feeding as more obligatory to provide for these patients is
psychologically rather than ethically based."4
Such a suggestion - that if we could just get over this mental hang-up about
food then we would all be in agreement - is particularly insulting to those who
have struggled hard to clarify meaningfully the distinction between food and
medicine. In fact, those who consistently distinguish between the two are
convinced that collapsing nutrition into the category of medical treatment misses
- or worse, ignores - several fundamental ethical points. Which brings us to
the second question.
b) How do these ethicists understand and interpret the ethical questions and
principles involved? For instance, what is medical treatment? What can we
expect from it? Are there different expectations of nutrition and hydration? In
emphasizing a benefit/burden or proportionality analysis, what has happened to
the Hippocratic injunction, "First, do no harm"?
When I originally set out to write this paper, my position was that nutrition
and hydration are never medical treatment. I have since altered my position, but I
still have some fundamental sympathies with the arguments leading to my former
position. What I would like to do in this paper is 1) present my original argument,
giving as much strength to that argument as I can; 2) show where it goes wrong;
3) show what sorts of patients (or proxies) can legitimately refuse this medical
treatment; 4) point out where my original position properly criticizes certain
arguments used by those who hold that provision of nourishment can be medical
treatment.
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The Argument Against Nutrition as Medical Treatment

Since the majority of the literature on the topic seems to have decided that
provision of nutrition and fluids is medical treatment, the first question to be
asked would be, what is a medical treatment? Then we can decide whether a
particular patient situation adequately fills this bill.
People would, I think, normally define "medical treatment" as an action or
group of actions performed to alleviate or neutralize some sort of pathological
condition or disease. This would include chemicals or antibiotics meant to cure,
or at least hold in abeyance, an invading disease, such as influenza, or internal
breakdown, like cancer; surgery or other lesser physical manipulations of
damaged parts - setting broken bones, traction, suturing, care of abrasions.
Normally, we think of this care as provided by a doctor or other health
professional, but it may consist of the Band-Aid or cough syrup provided by "Dr.
Mom."
A second question to be answered is, What are the responsibilities of those
who have been entrusted with the patient's care? Normally, a relatively mature
person has the responsibility for his or her own care. When the person becomes a
patient, however - when mental incompetence or physical disability or lack of
expertise renders self-care difficult or impossible - one counts on others to
provide for certain needs, and these care-givers assume corresponding
responsibilities. 1) The patient must be provided with the basic necessities oflife.
These would include air, protection from exposure, and nourishment and fluids.
2) The care-giver is called on to provide a humanly dignified environment and to
reduce the patient's discomforts. For many patients who cannot attend
themselves, this might include providing for sanitary needs, or prevention ofloss
of circulation or bed sores. 3) The patient's pain resulting from this medical
condition should be eased, if possible, and 4) the care-giver should attempt to
provide appropriate medical treatment, i.e., provide some way of eliminating or
stabilizing the condition or disease.
Sometimes, the first two categories are provided under medical supervision;
medical personnel, because of their expertise, will know the best ways of
providing these things for the patient's overall comfort and well-being. This does
not thereby render them medical treatments. If a doctor suggests to me that I walk
around to improve my circulation or eliminate indigestion, or even to promote
healthy convalescence of sutured muscles, one would call this sound advice, but
would be hard-pressed to call walking around "medical treatment."
The question is next asked: If provision of nutrition and hydration to a patient
who cannot provide these for himself are to be considered medical treatment,
then what do food and water treat? Clearly, food and water treat nothing (with
the possible exception of mal-nourishment and de-hydration). They do not make a
sick person well, but rather, without them, the person becomes sick and,
eventually, dies. For all other conditions, with subsequent medical treatment, the
body is running, and then breaks down. Food and water (along with oxygen) are
the fuel that keeps the body running. These are basic necessities for life itself;
without them, there is properly speaking no ability to become otherwise
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diseased or damaged.
For this reason, it is especially peculiar, to those who hold that provision of
food and water can never be medical treatments, to find, for example, the
carefully worded statements of the Vatican's 1980 Declaration on Euthanasia
used to promote the denial of such basic care in certain cases. John Paris and
Andrew Varga, for instance, construe the following passage from the Declaration
as support for this postion: "It is also permitted, with the patient's consent, to
interrupt1hese means (treatments), where the results fall short of expectations."5
One can only ask, what expectations can one have about nutrition and
hydration? Surely, no one expects them to cure the patient. How could they ever
fall short of the modest expectations one can reasonably demand of them?
Moral Principles Involved in the Issue of Withholding Treatment

Supposing that nutrition and hydration are not properly medical treatments,
we must ask: Does it really make a difference to the actual provision of
nourishment whether it is regarded as a medical treatment or not? Whichever it
is, if it is providing no benefit to the patient, we are obliged to continue to supply
it?
If your basic approach is utilitarian or consequentialist, the answer is clearly
No. All foreseeable consequences of the action are examined, weighed on the
scales of burdens and benefits, and a course of action chosen. This path the
President's Commission has taken. 6 Following such a path, there is no way to
reach the absolute position - that nutrition and hydration must always be
provided for the person who can be nourished - a position which is the mark of
the holder of the thesis "provision of nourishment is never medical treatment."
One must hold a type of ethical system in which human beings have an inherent
value, and certain actions (at least some) say something independently of the
intention of the agent. Such a system is natural law (in all its varieties).
Analyzing proportional benefits is not completely foreign to the tradition of
natural law but, in that tradition, benefits and consequences serve a secondary
function. What is of primary importance is the action itself and its meaning apart
from any particular agent who performs it, regardless of any consequences not
necessarily attached to that action. In a way, even for the natural law tradition, it
does not really make a difference whether or not provision of nourishment is
medical treatment. The same moral principles apply in either case.
According to this tradition, what am I attempting to do in any action? In some
way, I am attempting to fulfill myself. This is not self-fulfillment in the sense of
self-aggrandizement, but rather in the sense of following my proper nature, of
"becoming" in a properly human way. It would make no sense to attempt to
fulfill my humanness by attacking humanness in myself or in another; there
would be something illogical, something contradictory, about such an attempt.
Thus the basis for the Hippocratic rule: "First, do not harm." No action can be
ethically correct which, by the intention of the actor or the very meaning of the
action itself, attacks a human being. I may attack a disease or condition, but not a
human being.
The same principles apply to all actions we do, and thus are equally applicable
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to treating a person medically: 1) the treatment might prove beneficial in curing
the condition, in which case it is permissible and encouraged; 2) the treatment
might actually be detrimental to the patient, causing some damage, in which case
it attacks the person, rendering it impermissible; 3) the treatment might be neither
helpful nor harmful, at best holding steady, and at worst losing ground to the
condition. In this case, I may continue it or end it, based on the grounds of
burdens vs. benefits.
This is the crux of the question. Having passed the basic ethical test of "Do no
harm," medical procedures are then judged appropriate, measured on the scale of
proportion: Does this treatment provide some sort of benefit proportional to the
discomfort? Therefore, what makes the withdrawal or non-use of useless
treatment permissible is not (simply) that the burdens outweigh the benefits.
More fundamentally, it is the fact that withdrawal or non-use does not attack the
patient; it does no more harm to the patient than what the disease or condition
already supplies. Thus, when cancer is marching apace through the body of a
patient faster than it can be combatted, one may stop the treatment. Why? The
treatment is doing no good against the disease. Non-treatment here does not
attack the person, even though the patient's death may come faster. It does no
good to use the treatment; it does no (more) harm to stop it.
What about the denial of nutrition and hydration to a dying patient? Let us
take the same cancer patient, being nourished by a nasogastric tube or
gastrostomy. Since it does nothing toward curing the patient,.why not simply stop
it? The response comes back loud and clear: nourishment is not supposed to cure
the patient, and it never can. In this case, providing it for the patient may do no
(more) good, but denial of nourishment directly harms the person. Without a
medical treatment, a person may (even against improbable odds) survive;
without nourishment, one cannot survive. The withdrawal or denial of
nourishment and hydration attacks the person by deliberately adding a new
debilitating condition to the person's health, a condition for which I as care-giver
am responsible, not some force of nature or accident. It attacks the person as
really as if I placed him in a vacuum, or left him on a mountainside to die of
exposure. As Gilbert Meilaender puts it:
Remove him from a respirator and he may die - but then, he may also surprise us and
continue to breathe spontaneously. We test to see if the patient can breathe. Ifhe does, it
is not our task - unless we are aiming at his death - now to smother him (or to stop
feeding him).?

Death comes from deprivation of nourishment with the surety of death as the
result of having the air sucked out of a room.
There are situations in which nutrition and fluids need not be given, but only if
ceasing nourishment does no more harm. 8 Only two situations pass the test. a)
Giving nutrition or fluids actually causes problems. Here, providing the
nourishment constitutes an attack on the person. b) The failure to provide
nourishment does no more harm to the patient than the condition that patient
already bears, and so it can be weighed proportionally. One instance of this is
when the nourishment is not absorbed by the body. Giving such nourishment
would be a waste, equivalent to simply throwing it out. A second possibility
May, 1994

81

would present itself in the situation of a patient very near death. Failure to take in
some sustenance will not harm a patient any more than the progressing illness
will, and might in fact provide the patient a few hours or days of freedom from
tubery, and some peace of mind in preparation for death. Only in these two
situations is failure to provide nourishment ethically justifiable, according to this
scheme.
Can A Patient Ever Refuse Treatment? The Principle of Totality
It seems clear from the foregoing argument that,as long as one holds that
nourishment is not medical treatment, the caregiver could not legitimately
withhold or withdraw it from a patient. Could a patient, however, refuse
nutrition, especially if it is artifically provided and such living has proven
burdensome, for himself or his family? In such a situation, a clear wish of the
patient could release the providers from responsibility. The possibility of ethical
refusal would also give such care-givers an opening for a decision to withhold
nourishment in the case of an incompetent patient.
The Catholic tradition, of which I am a part, following natural law principles,
has provided some answer to this question, set out fairly clearly by Pope Pius XII
as the principle of totality.9 This principle indicates that I may destroy a part
-even a healthy part - of my body for the sake of the whole. The "whole" here
may refer, not just to the body, but to the spiritual whole as well. In other words,
for the greater personalistic good, I may destroy a part of my body. This greater
personalistic goal must be of great importance, and achievable by no other means.
An important limitation is attached to this principle, however: I may not destroy
the life of the whole body for the sake of the whole, or for the sake of a part. This
would be equivalent to the Vietnam justification, "We destroyed the village in
order to save it." Save it for what, if it no longer exists? The same applies to my
earthly life - which properly speaking is the realm of ethics. The denial of
nutrition and hydration is precisely that - an attack on the life of the person.
We have already seen two situations in which deprivation of nourishment
-by regular or artificial means - does not constitute an attack on the person.
The area of real concern, however, is when the food does nourish, it does no
harm, and is artificially administered. Having been at one point solidly in the
"nourishment does not equal medical treatment" camp, I now hold that artificial
provision of nourishment is medical treatment. What forced me to alter my
position?

When Provision of Nourishment IS Medical Treatment

The difficulty for those who say that provision of nourishment is never medical
treatment, and thus its withdrawal never justified (except in the two situations
listed), lies in where their arguments focus; the solution lies in changing that focus.
In developing as strong a case as I can for this position, I have tried to put the
focus in the same place as its strongest advocates. That focus is on the nutrition
and hydration itself. Nourishment and fluids are not in themselves medicines or
treatment for any malady except their lack.
The real question, however, lies not with the nutrition or hydration, but in the
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means of delivery. The procedure that raised these questions in the first place is
the provision of nutrition and hydration by artificial means: by intravenous tube,
by nasogastric tube, by gastrostomy tube. There are some who would object to
this distinction by saying that delivery through a few inches of plastic tubing or by
medical personnel does not thereby magically transform the food into medicine.
While this observation is correct, however, the objection misses the point. The
key issue here is that the means of delivery is itself a treatment for some condition.
What, for example, does dialysis treat? It treats kidney failure. It does this, not
by making the kidneys better, but by performing the kidney's functions. A person
is generally held to be within his or her ethical rights to dispense with further
treatment if it becomes disproportionate to the benefits obtained.
What does tube feeding treat? It treats an inability to ingest (enough)
nourishment. This may be due to unconsciousness, or an inability to swallow, or
the fact that food by mouth would cause the patient harm. In other words, it
performs the same kind of function that dialysis or a respirator might perform: it
does the job of a non-functioning part of the body. Thus, it is medical treatment,
and its non-use may be perfectly legitimate in more cases than the two outlined
earlier, without thereby incurring the stigma of doing the patient harm.
According to George Annas,
A gastrostomy tube is not [to use the words of Paul Brophy's guardian ad litem] "a need
common to all human beings"; it is an intervention required by Mr. Brophy because of
his injury; and if it is withheld, Mr. Brophy will die as surely from the "natural course" of
his illness as Karen Ann Quinlan would have had she been removed from her ventilator
(instead of being carefully weaned from it}.10

He further remarks: "Food and water may be 'basic,' but deprivation of air is at
least as basic and withholding it will lead to death as surely, and much more
swiftly."ll
Grounds for Legitimately Foregoing Nutrition and Hydration

Having decided that artificial means of providing nutrition and hydration are
medical treatments, the question remains: When can they legitimately be
foregone? The patient in the persistent vegetative state is one instance of a very
difficult circumstance: the person with long-term (possibly permanent) inability
to eat and drink, yet who is not dying.
As Daniel Callahan put it, "The time to curtail abuses in the future is to begin
now in trying to go through those steps that will draw lines very carefully."12 For
those who hold that even artificial means of provision of nourishment and fluids
does not equal medical treatment, the line has already been crossed; once you can
stop feeding someone, there is no logical or ethical difference between this and
supplying a lethal injection. Since, as we have seen, artificial provision of
nutrition and hydration is medical treatment, the line has not necessarily been
crossed, but we appear to have come right up to it. What needs to be found is
some standard of non-treatment.
For some insight into this area, let us turn to Richard McCormick's 1974
article, "To Save or Let Die." The thrust of his argument is that human
May, 1994

83

living is for human relationships, for knowing and loving the world around us
and those people we encounter in it. He reminds us that "life is not a value to be
preserved in and for itself," but rather "is a value to be preserved only insofar as it
contains some potentiality for human relationships." When this potentiality no
longer exists or would be completely submerged in "the mere effort for survival,"
we canjudge that such a life has reached its potential, and that any means to keep
it going are "extraordinary" or disproportionate.13
So the two focal points in this analysis would be I) is there no more potential
for properly human living or relationships? and 2) will the living remain buried in
merely staying alive? If one or both of these criteria are met, then the patient may
be allowed to die through lack of treatment. Two very important points of
clarification need to be raised here, however.
a) Adoption of this standard and the subsequent choice against nutrition do
not amount to saying "It is better to be dead than alive."14 Rather, the patient is
saying, "It is better to qv~t~ls way rather than that." As McCormick himself puts
it, such a choice "nee~ involve only a thoroughly Christian assertion that there
are values greater in life than living, that we all retain the right to decide how we
shall live while dying."15
.
b) Adoption of this standard is not equivalent to saying that certain non-dying
patients, especially ones in persistent vegetative states, are therefore merely
vegetables, and that it is of no use maintaining a merely biological existence. 16 As
Gilbert Meilaender notes, such a view is unnecessarily dualistic, separating
personhood from the body.,17 Edward Bayer concurs. Speaking from the
Catholic metaphysical tradition, he points out that it is not just the soul who is the
person, but body and soul together make one being, one person. The body is not a
belonging like a coat, nor could one legitimately claim that killing the body does
not kill the person.18 Even Catholic authors can make the same mistakes.
McCormick himself apparently slips on this issue. Interpreting (with John Paris)
his own 1982 testimony before the President's Commission on Ethical Problems
in Medicine, McCormick writes the following:
[T]he question was asked whether there was any moral difference between removing a
respirator, antibiotics or artificial feeding from Karen Ann Quinlan . The reply from the
Catholic tradition was clearly, " No." If, for example, she were to contract pneumonia,
there wo uld be no need to use antibiotics because she would stand to gain nothing from
such an intervention. A similar argument could likewise be made with regard to the
continued use of feeding through the nasogastric tube. 19

Several things are wrong with this interpretation. The first we mentioned
earlier: what are the expectations of each of these treatments? If we expect them
to bring the patient back to perfect health, then naturally these limited measures
will "do the patient no good." This is not a reasonable expectation from the
antibiotics, or from feeding. The second problem is that the argument implies that
the treatment affects only the body, and the real patient, the person, remains
somehow unaffected. This is a dualistic attitude, at odds with a proper
understanding (or certainly with a Catholic understanding) of the person.
The third point comes even if we assume that no dualism is intended. The basic
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point is that McCormick's comments seem to be saying, "This person has so little,
it's not worth trying to retain." Analogously, one might argue that, ifthe poverty
level is ten thousand dollars per year, and person P is only bringing home ten
dollars a week, we could prevent person P from receiving his paltry sum because
"it is not doing him any good." It seems to me that even this ten dollars is doing
the person some good, that without it one is definitely worse off, and (relative to
our patient, and in the words of Flanner O'Connor), "You Can't Be Any Poorer
Than Dead."
This seems to be the point that several other writers are making, especially in
regard to patients who are just plain not dying, such as the PVS patient, who will
continue to live indefinitely as long as the care-giver provides the necessities of
life-air, nutrition and protection. Given the fact that PVS patients do
occasionally (albeit rarely) recover, these patients do retain some potential for
human relationships, although the chance that these relationships might be
regained is admittedly very small. Still, it is something. This being the case, we
should consider Gilbert Meilaender's arguments against withdrawal of artificial
means of nourishment in cases of persistent vegetative state. Stopping a respirator
is not quite the same as stopping nutrition. With a respirator, the person can
spontaneously begin breathing.2o There is the possibility of weaning a person
from a respirator, even one in a coma or PVS. There is no such possibility with
artificial means of supplying nourishment. You cannot take a patient off it
without the patient's being conscious. Another difference lies in the accessibility.
If you do not make the patient's diaphragm work, at least the air is right there for
him to breathe should he be able to do so on his own, even if he is unconscious.
Not so with food. The patient does not live in an environment of food, ready for
intake should his spontaneous bodily apparatus start drawing it in. It must be
supplied, and in this regard ceasing to provide nutrition and hydration takes on
more the flavor of denying the patient air, not just assistance in breathing.
The point here is that there does seem to be a real difference (Gerald Kelly's
comments notwithstanding) between medically assisted nutrition and hydration
and any other form of medical treatment, including other life-sustaining
measures. Statements by the Pontifical Academy of Sciences and the New Jersey
bishops calling for maintenance of nutrition and hydration as part of normal care
seem to have had this distinction in mind. 21
Furthermore, there is the real danger of creeping euthanasia, based on unsound
principles or unprincipled actions. There does seem to be a progression (not to be
confused with "progress") toward making more and more medically supervised
activities optional, which becomes particularly dangerous for the incompetent
patient. David Wikler notes the parallel mar.9h toward looser and looser
standards in regards to the types of patients for whom medical treatments become
"option~l": first it was for "brain dead" patients, with a corresponding
redefinition of what constitutes death; then it was the PVS patient dependent (or
at least though to be dependent) on a respirator, until today it is a question of
removing all artificial means of life-support, even for a patient who "had not yet
reached the last stage of dementia."22
The line separating us from the on-coming traffic of so-called "mercy killing"
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is difficult to see when the conditions are so foggy and we are justifiably
frightened when we try to dance on a line we can hardly see. Still, the line is there,
and it is our task to stake it out, so that we will not become guilty of altering our
understanding of medical treatment to the point where we think of denial of
nutrition and hydration as "the only effective way to make certain that a large
number of biologically tenacious patients actually die."23 We must take care not
to think of the dying or the permanently unconscious as bodies taking up space, as
empty human shells that just will not kick off.
While I retain sympathies for those who oppose foregoing nutrition and
hydration, however, and advocate in most situations its retention until death is
imminent, we must keep in mind the fact that, while death is not preferable to life,
some ways ofliving are better than others; that, while it may be difficult to see the
burden that a PVS patient could possibly experience by being maintained on
artificial life-support, it may well be that other burdens are too heavy to be borne.
Families are just as much affected by McCormick's principle that living should
not be buried in the simple maintenence of existence; families have lives as well,
and there is a point at which they become buried in their loved one's simple
survival unless the patient or the guardians are permitted to say, "That is
enough." What is required is that they take with the utmost seriousness the
injunction, "First, do no harm."
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